Hash code checks

[SAVIOCvs@aol.com]

I agree (in part) with Susan.

 

SAVIOC code can be hash-checked by ordinary people on election morning.  If the Elections office publishes (puts on the web) all county ballots and their corresponding hash codes, the ballots can be checked as well.  Since everything for a SAVIOC system is on a diskette, and multiple identical copies can be generated during startup, diskettes can be checked in any personal laptop with a floppy drive, not just in the machines set up by elections officials.

 

Chuck Gaston

SAVIOC Voting Systems

 

 

In a message dated 12/9/2004 10:53:01 PM Eastern Standard Time, sklein@CPCUG.ORG writes:

On Thu, 2004-12-09 at 21:30, susan eustis wrote:
> I believe that election systems need to be able to be tested and confirmed
> as to correctness by ordinary people.  I believe that software hash of code
> systems on lab inspected code and text based configuration that is simple
> enough to be inspected by the candidates and poll workers as to correctness
> provide that basic protection of the accuracy of the system.
>
> I believe all code should be hashed.  That the encryption should be checked
> by the poll workers on election morning.
>
> Susan Eustis
> President
> WinterGreen Research
> 6 Raymond Street
> Lexington, MA 02421
> Tel: (781) 863-5078
>  Cell: (617)852-7876